The State of Utah v. Steven Ray Allen : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1990
The State of Utah v. Steven Ray Allen : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Christine F. Soltis: Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Eric P. Swenson, Michael H. Wray; attorneys for appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Allen, No. 900156.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2933
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
BRIEF 
uian 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
45.9 
DOCKET NO. %£Et£z 
UlttM aurKtIVIt U A W f 
BRIEF 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
STEVEN RAY ALLEN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Docket No. 900156 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT, GRAND COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE BOYD BUNNELL, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE. 
ERIC P. SWENSON (3171) 
P.O. Box 940 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Telephone: (801) 587-2843 
MICHAEL H. WRAY, (4944) 
9 Exchange Place, #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-2230 
Attorneys for Appellant 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Appellee F I L E D 
NOV 7 1991 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
IN THE SUPREME r u x AH 
P1 a m t x L1 cm ,
 r r . „ e c , , r k e t No. 900151] 
STISVl' M 
Defendant ana Appeiiti • 
Priority 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPEh] AN« ' 
APPEAL- l*H0M THE SEVENTH DISTRICT ''iH"'l, • ': STATE 
<~F U'l'^li THE HONOKABu', MM y i' h'lM' uISTRICT COURT JUDGE, 
ERIC P. SWENSON (3171) 
P.O. Box 940 
Monticello, Utah 84 5if: 
Telephone : (ROT. 5 - "; - / 8 4 3 
MICHAEL .- .4044 
9 Exchange Place, #9 00 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 11 
Telephone: (801) 359-2230 
Attorney:-; I 1 J \pp*.-' I ! 
R. PAUL VAN UAH 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney Gen*-in 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 .;* 
a i.ur Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
POINT ONE 
ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR 
BAD ACTS OF CHILD ABUSE AND RELATED EARLIER 
MEDICAL INJURIES OF THE CHILD WAS ERROR 
POINT TWO 
POINT THREE 
POINT FOUR 
ALLOWING DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS TO LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS WAS ERROR 
FAILURE TO ALLOW THE JURY TO CONSIDER, AND 
FAILURE TO ALLOW DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS AS TO LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES, 
WASERROR 13 
THE EVIDENCE, PARTICULARLY AS TO DEFENDANT'S 
INTENT, AND AS TO WHETHER HE IN FACT CAUSED 
THE CHILD'S DEATH, WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THECONVICTION 16 
CONCLUSION 18 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 19 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES Page 
Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (1991) 5 
Boggess v. State, 655 P. 2d 654 (Utah 1982) 15 
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) 11 
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) 9 
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) 7 
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) 6 
Commonwealth v. Labbe, 373 N.E.2d 227 (Mass. App. 1978) 2 
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) 6 
Estelle, v. McGuire, 902 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1990), Supreme 
Court Docket No. 90-1074 3 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 10 
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) 9 
New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990) 8 
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) 9 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) 8 
Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069 
(Utah 1991) 11 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P. 2d 1068 (Utah 1985) 17 
Schleret v. State, 311 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. 1981) 2 
State v. Anderson, 789 P. 2d 27 (1990) 15 
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983) 13 
State v. Bishop, 753 P. 2d 439 (Utah 1988) 12 
State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991) 6 
ii 
State v. Coleman, 579 P.2d 732 (Mont. 1978) 7 
State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527 (Utah 1983) 14 
State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987) 9 
State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989) 5 
State v. Geisler, 594 A.2d 985 (Conn. App., en banc, 1991) 8 
State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989) 13 
State v. Holland, 346 N.W.2d 302 (S.D. 1984) 2 
State v. James, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah 1991) 4,12,17,18 
State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134 (Utah App. 1989) 4 
State v. Jensen, 170 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Utah 1991) 13 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) 8 
State v. Marshall, 791 P. 2d 880 (Utah App. 1990) 11 
State v. Oliver, 170 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (Utah App. 1991) 17 
State v. Park, 810 P.2d 456 (Utah App. 1991) 6 
State v. Phillips, 399 S.E.2d 293 (N.C. 1991), cert, denied, 
Phillips v. North Carolina, 111 S.Ct. 2804 (1991) 2 
State v. Quintero, 60 U.S.L.W. 2165, 1991 WL 207111 (Iowa App. 
1991) 5 
State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah 1991) 10 
State v. Sherard, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Utah App. 1991) 14,15 
State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991) 6 
State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1991) 9 
State v. Singh, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah App. 1991) 13 
State v. Standiford, 769 P. 2d 254 (Utah 1988) 14,15 
State v. Steggell, 660 P. 2d 252 (Utah 1983) 10,11 
State v. Tanner, 675 P. 2d 539 (Utah 1983) 2 
iii 
State v. Thomas, 73 S.E.2d 722 (S.C. 1952) 12,13 
State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991) 8 
State v. Tillman, 750 P. 2d 546 (Utah 1987) 15 
State v. Velarde, 734 P. 2d 440 (Utah 1986) 10 
State v. Verde, 770 P. 2d 116 (Utah 1989) 16 
State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296 (Utah App. 1991) 10,11 
Struve v. Wilcox, 579 P.2d 1188 (Idaho 1978), cert. den. 
439 U.S. 1123 (1979) 7 
United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 1 
United States v. Shunk, 881 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1989) 11 
United States v. Wolfenbarger, 696 F.2d 750 (10th Cir. 1982)...11 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) 11 
STATUTES AND COURT RULES 
Idaho Code, 19-4503 7 
Idaho Code, 19-4514 7 
Rule 12(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 10,11 
Rule 19 (c) , Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 15 
Rule 103 (d) , Utah Rules of Evidence 15 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence 4 
Rule 4 04(b) , U.R.E 2,4 
Utah Code Annotated, 76-5-206 14 
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 14 8 
OTHER AUTHORITY 
Enhancing Penalties by Admitting "Bad Character" Evidence 
During Guilt Phase of Criminal Trials—State v. Bishop, 
1989 Utah Law Review, 1013 1 
iv 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
STEVEN RAY ALLEN, ] 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Case No, 900156 
i Priority No. 2 
APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR 
BAD ACTS OF CHILD ABUSE AND RELATED EARLIER 
MEDICAL INJURIES OF THE CHILD WAS ERROR. 
There is an old saying that you can take the fly out of the 
soup, but not the taste of the fly out of the soup. This adage 
illustrates the dilemma that courts face when weighing the 
probative value of prior bad acts against their obvious prejudice. 
See, United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 
Enhancing Penalties by Admitting "Bad Character" Evidence During 
Guilt Phase of Criminal Trials—State v. Bishop, 1989 Utah Law 
Review, 1013, 1016-1017. In this case, a fundamental dispute 
exists between the parties as to whether this Court's ruling in 
State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539 (Utah 1983), should be extended to 
Mr Allen's conduct. 
Tanner allowed the use of testimony of specific instances of 
prior abuse of a child who later died from a blow to the head. The 
earlier acts evidenced not only the actor's intent and motive, but 
were entirely consistent with the injuries which caused the child's 
death. That case therefore presented a situation where the 
defendant's prior bad acts properly placed the entire affair in a 
meaningful context. This is consistent with the meaning and purpose 
of Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Virtually all of the cases cited by Appellee follow the 
reasoning found in Tanner. However, none of those cases dealt with 
the same problem found in Mr. Allen's situation, namely, the extent 
to which prior abusive conduct is admissible in a case where the 
cause of death is not determined. Schleret v. State, 311 N.W.2d 
843 (Minn. 1981) involved a brain injury following repeated abuse. 
State v. Phillips, 399 S.E.2d 293 (N.C. 1991), cert, denied, 
Phillips v. North Carolina, 111 S.Ct. 2804 (1991), approved of the 
use of the battered child syndrome in the context of a torture 
murder. Commonwealth v. Labbe, 373 N.E.2d 227 (Mass. App. 1978) 
approved of evidence of earlier injuries to a child who later died 
of liver damage caused by a blow inflicted at a time when the 
defendant was alone with the child. The child's frequent injuries 
were admissible to show that someone in a custodial relation to the 
boy bore him ill will. State v. Holland, 346 N.W.2d 302 (S.D. 
1984) involved a finding that the child died of suffocation 
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following repeated abuse. These cases would likely have different 
outcomes if the post mortem findings were as inconclusive as those 
in Mr. Allen's case. 
The United States Supreme Court now has under consideration a 
case which may address some of the same critical issues involved 
in this case. Estelle v. McGuire, 902 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1990), 
Supreme Court Docket Number 90-1074 (Argued October 9, 1991). The 
Ninth Circuit set aside a child-murder conviction in which the 
prosecution used evidence of the child's earlier injuries and the 
battered child syndrome, in conformance with well established 
California law. However, the Ninth Circuit held that the evidence 
was not relevant since the injuries were not sufficiently linked to 
the defendant's conduct. McGuire also involved a jury instruction 
which did not track the specific issue for which the jurors would 
use the prior-injuries evidence. Accordingly, the Court ruled that 
McGuire had been denied a fundamentally fair trial in violation of 
the Due Process Clause. 
This case is similar to McGuire in that the prior-injuries-
and-conduct evidence does not adequately relate to one of the 
elements of the offense charged, that is, the cause of the child's 
death. In addition, the jury instruction, attached hereto as 
Addendum Number One, merely cautions the jury that the prior 
similar acts should only be considered as evidence of the 
defendant's intentional, and not mistaken acts. And like the 
instruction condemned by the Ninth Circuit in McGuire, the guidance 
given the jury in this case also permitted a finding of guilt of 
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the crime charged by concluding that Mr. Allen had committed 
similar acts. 
This case contrasts with this Court's recent ruling in State 
v. James, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah 1991). James is a case where 
there was no compelling evidence that the child's death was 
accidental, or that the death was not by criminal means. Mr. 
Allen's situation involves two equally supportable theories, one as 
to an accidental death, and the other, that the death was by 
criminal means. These facts require that the Court resolve the 
question as to the use of the challenged evidence in Mr. Allen's 
favor. 
Accordingly, the trial court failed to adequately weigh the 
probative value of the evidence, as required under Rule 404(b), 
U.R.E., against its tendency to unfairly prejudice Mr. Allen, as 
required by Rule 403, U.R.E; State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 
(Utah App. 1989). Mr. Allen's prior abusive acts admittedly have 
some probative value in that they bear on the question of his 
intent or motive on the day of the child's death. However, those 
acts and the child's earlier injuries do not establish a reliable 
link with either the actual cause or the method or manner of the 
child's death. The jurors were therefore presented with a situation 
where they had to speculate, unlike James, as to something other 
than the defendant's intent and motive. It is this weakness in the 
prosecution's case that the Court must review in determining 
whether the prior bad acts unfairly prejudiced Mr. Allen. It is Mr. 
Allen's contention that this evidence made it likely that the jury 
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chose to punish him for the similar rather than the charged act, 
concluding that he is a bad person inclined to violate the law. 
See, e.g., State v. Gardner. 789 P.2d 273, 289, n.l (Utah 1989) 
(Justice Stewart, concurring). 
POINT TWO 
ALLOWING DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS TO 
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS WAS ERROR. 
This Court should first decide what standard of review will 
apply to the question of whether Mr. Allen's statements to the 
police were coerced in light of the recent case of Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 111 S.Ct.1246 (1991). Appellant has suggested in his 
Supp1ementa1 Brief that this Court should as a matter of state 
constitutional law adopt a strict policy of reversing every case 
where a coerced confession is used. Appellant's Supplemental 
Brief, p. 2-4. The Iowa Court of Appeals recently relied on that 
state constitution's due process guarantee as a basis for 
disagreeing with Fulminante, holding that the use of a coerced 
statement is indeed a structural flaw in the trial process 
warranting automatic reversal. State v. Quintero, 60 U.S.L.W. 
2165, 1991 WL 207111 (Iowa App. 1991). The use of this rigorous 
standard provides the proper framework in which to evaluate Mr. 
Allen's contentions. 
The trial court refused to listen to a tape recording of the 
abuse Allen received during his arrest. Suppression Motion, Tr. 
150-151; Trial, Tr. 790. Nor was the jury allowed to determine the 
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context in which the statements were made. California v. 
Trombetta. 467 U.S. 479 (1984); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 
(1986). This unwillingness to fully consider the evidence 
inevitably resulted in a ruling that the statements were voluntary. 
Surprisingly, the government's first line of defense to this claim 
of error is that the trial court in fact did listen to the 
recording. Appellee's Brief, p. 34. This most certainly is not the 
case. Appellant attaches as Addendum Number Two, the portions of 
the record which should lay this contention to rest. If in 
reviewing the record this Court remains uncertain as to whether in 
fact the trial court listened to the tape, then Appellant requests 
that the case be remanded for a factual determination on this 
question. 
Contrary to Appellee's assertion, Appellee's Brief, p. 38, 
attenuation is in fact a critical aspect of this case. There are 
two issues which come under the heading of "attenuation". The 
first concerns the question of voluntariness and involves the issue 
of whether the effect of the abuse Mr. Allen received during his 
arrest was sufficiently dissipated at the time of his 
interrogation. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 
1991) ; State v. Park, 810 P.2d 456 (Utah App. 1991) ; State v. Sims, 
808 P. 2d 141 (Utah App. 1991). The second issue is whether the 
link between Mr. Allen's arrest in Idaho and subsequent illegal 
detention in Montana was sufficiently attenuated at the time of his 
interrogation. The issue of attenuation-voluntariness is difficult 
for this Court to resolve, since the trial court did not fully 
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consider the evidence, particularly the tape recording, as well as 
failing to make adequate findings on this issue. 
Appellee did not adequately respond to the attenuation issue 
involved in Mr, Allen's Idaho arrest and Montana detention, see, 
Appellee's Brief, p. 37-38, n. 16, other than concluding without 
discussion that the officers had legal authority to make the 
arrest. They may have had such authority, as private citizens, 
Idaho Code, 19-4514, or under the common law rule, State v. 
Coleman, 579 P.2d 732, 744 (Mont. 1978). However, the officers 
clearly had no right to take him to Montana without processing him 
through the Idaho courts. Idaho Code, 19-4503, et. seq. (Idaho 
Extradition Law); Struve v. Wilcox, 579 P.2d 1188, 1195-1196 (Idaho 
1978), cert. den. 439 U.S. 1123 (1979) (Fugitive arrested in Idaho 
entitled to a probable cause hearing and the right to counsel upon 
arraignment). Appellant's contention that the unlawful Montana 
detention itself renders the statements inadmissible absent some 
showing of attenuation is not addressed in the State's brief. Nor 
was this issue included in the trial court's decision from the 
bench at the conclusion of the suppression hearing, although 
Appellant had briefed this issue. Judgment Roll and Index, p. 210-
238. However, the trial court later ruled that the Idaho arrest 
was immaterial. See, Trial, Tr. 794. An unlawful arrest or 
detention is an important factor in determining whether an 
accused's statements are voluntary or otherwise tainted. See, 
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), and the authorities cited 
in Brief of Appellant, at p. 25. 
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Appellant is obliged to inform this Court that there is a 
recent Supreme Court case, decided after Mr. Allen's trial, but not 
discussed in Appellee's Brief, which may be contrary to Appellant's 
position regarding his unlawful Montana detention. New York v. 
Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990). Harris involved a warrantless arrest 
following an unlawful entry into the suspect's apartment, in 
violation of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). The Court 
held that this manner of arrest does not require the suppression of 
the defendant's subsequent statements if there was probable cause 
for the arrest. The Harris reasoning would not satisfy Utah's 
constitutional requirements. Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 
14; State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990); State v. Thompson, 
810 P. 2d 415 (Utah 1991) . These Utah cases on this subject confirm 
the trend of Utah courts to provide more protection than that found 
under federal law. In State v. Geisler, 594 A.2d 985 (Conn. App., 
en banc, 1991), the Connecticut court rejected the Harris 
reasoning, and chose instead to impose a stricter standard using 
the same rationale approved by the Utah courts. Therefore, this 
Court should rule that Mr. Allen's statements are inadmissible. 
Appellant claims that his waiver of the right to remain silent 
was inadequate. Appellant's Brief, P. 29-31. The record reveals 
that the Attorney General's Investigator, Mr. Hines, rushed to 
Montana after learning of Mr. Allen's arrest to quickly interrogate 
him in order to "eliminate mostly jail contaminance (sic)", i.e., 
legal advice from lawyers, Suppression Motion, Tr. 34, immediately 
asked the Sheriff if Allen had contacted an attorney, Tr. 37-38, 
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and then began his interview by deliberately failing to read Mr. 
Allen the waiver portion of the Miranda form. Plaintiff's Exhibit 
Number Eight, attached hereto as Addendum Number Three; 
Suppression Motion, Tr. 38-39; Trial, Tr. 596-598; 614-616. 
Mr. Allen never signed the form signifying that he understood 
his rights and wished to go ahead with questioning. Rather, there 
is the interrogators' mere assurance that in fact there was a valid 
waiver. One recent case illustrates the principle that the signing 
of a waiver form indicates that a subject in fact understood his 
rights and waived the right to remain silent. State v. Singer, 815 
P.2d 1303, 1310 (Utah App. 1991). The deception in not presenting 
the entire waiver form effectively prevented Mr. Allen from having 
a "...full awareness both of the nature of the right being 
abandoned and of the consequences of the decision to abandon it." 
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). 
This Court has held that a waiver of the right to remain 
silent "... must be both intentional and made with full knowledge 
of the consequences, and the defendant is given the benefit of 
every reasonable presumption against such a waiver", State v. 
Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1211 (Utah 1987), citing Brewer v. Williams, 
430 U.S. 387 (1977). Fulton, at 1211, also held that "In 
determining the validity of a waiver, a court is to consider all 
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, as well as the 
suspect's ability to clearly understand the import of his actions" 
(Emphasis Supplied), citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 
372-376 (1979). Mr. Hines failure to provide all of the contents of 
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the waiver form to Mr. Allen clearly violates this standard. 
However, the State claims that Mr. Hines did read and then 
explain the rights on the form. Appellee's Brief, p. 40. This is 
in fact not the case. Suppression Motion, Tr. 38-39; Trial, Tr. 
596-598, 614-616. Mr. Allen received no explanation as to the 
contents of the form which pertained to the waiver of his rights. 
And, Appelleefs Brief completely fails to address any of the legal 
issues which arose as a result of this episode. Therefore, since 
the State has failed in its burden to prove a valid waiver, Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 
440, 443 (Utah 1986), this Court should reverse Mr. Allen's 
conviction. 
Still another issue involves the fact that the trial court's 
decision from the bench failed to fully cover the wide range of 
issues involved in the use of Mr. Allen's statements to the police, 
and lacked the depth necessary for appellate review. Rule 12(c), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 7, 14-15 (Utah 1991); State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1300-1301 
(Utah App. 1991). Appellant amply documents six areas in which the 
Court failed to address key issues raised in his suppression 
motion. See, Brief of Appellant, p. 33. In contrast, Appellee 
fails to adequately address any of these claims. Appellee's Brief, 
p. 44-45. 
Appellee claims that Mr. Allen waived this most important 
point, citing State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983). 
However, Steggell was decided well before the many cases refining 
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the obligation of findings, and in any event did not involve a 
suppression motion. Rather, Stecrcrell pertained to counsel's 
failure to object to the court's comments about a witness' 
testimony. Appellee refers to no other case. There is no statute 
or procedural rule which requires counsel to make the request or 
waive the right. And, a waiver cannot be implied when the record 
is silent on this issue, c.f., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 
(1969). The modern trend in Utah is that a party's conduct 
amounting to a waiver must be unequivocal and inconsistent with any 
other intent. See, e.g., Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 
808 P.2d 1069, 1074-1075 (Utah 1991); 
Although adequate findings are Mr. Allen's right, Rule 12(c), 
U.R. Cr.P, they are also for the benefit of the reviewing courts. 
State v. Vigil, supra, at 30; State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 
n. 1 (Utah App. 1990) . This is particularly important in Mr. 
Allen's case, where the trial court failed to consider such crucial 
evidence as the tape recording of the arrest, and failed to address 
many of the factual and legal issues in its decision from the 
bench. 
Turning to another issue, the Tenth Circuit has held: "A 
defendant cannot be convicted solely on the basis of an 
uncorroborated extrajudicial statement". United States v. 
Wolfenbarger, 696 F.2d 750, 752 (10th Cir. 1982), citing Wong Sun 
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Historically, the purpose 
of the corpus delicti doctrine was to prevent convictions based on 
coerced confessions. United States v. Shunkf 881 F.2d 917, 919 
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(10th Cir. 1989) . This doctrine is therefore of particular 
importance when viewed in light of Mr. Allen's claim that his 
statements were coerced. 
Appellant asserts that the State failed to prove the corpus 
delicti of the crime charged as to the criminal means of the 
victim's death, thereby making Mr. Allen's statements to the police 
inadmissible. See, State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988), and 
Brief of Appellant, p. 31-32. Appellee's first defense to this 
argument, Appellee's Brief, p. 44, misstates the facts by alleging 
that the medical evidence established that the child had not died 
of natural causes. To the contrary, the medical evidence 
established no cause of death at all, natural or otherwise. See, 
Trial, Tr. 437, 495, 502 (Dr. Fantelli); Tr. 559-560 (Dr. Palmer); 
Tr. 377-378 (Dr. Murray); and Tr. 662 (Dr. Rothfeder). And, some 
of the pathologist's observations were entirely consistent with a 
death by natural and non criminal means, Tr. 564-567 (Findings 
consistent with child's aspiration of candy). 
If the medical findings had specifically indicated that the 
child did not die of natural causes, then this case would fall 
within State v. James, supra, citing State v. Thomas, 73 S.E.2d 722 
(S.C. 1952). James involved a situation where the sole caretaker 
reported the child missing, claiming that the victim was taken from 
a locked car parked at a shopping center. The child's remains were 
later found concealed in the waters of a marina. No specific cause 
of death was ascribed by the State's pathologist. The body was 
wrapped with a covering in the sole possession of the caretaker and 
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which came from the James' residence, had not been in the car when 
the alleged kidnapping had occurred. Thomas involved a situation 
where the pathologist testified that a blow causing the damage 
which was found on the victim's facial structure would have been 
fatal, although no exact cause of death could be determined. Mr. 
Allen's case presents two supportable theories as to the cause of 
the child's death. Since both are plausible, the State has failed 
to m^et its burden of proof that death was indeed caused by 
criminal means. Therefore, his statements should not have been 
admitted. 
POXNT THREE 
FAILURE TO ALLOW THE JURY TO CONSIDER, AND 
FAILURE TO ALLOW DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS AS TO LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES, 
WAS ERROR. 
In State v. Jensen, 170 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 32 (Utah 1991), 
this Court recently set out the test fo*- determining when a lesser 
included offense instruction must be given by the trial court. The 
test requires a showing that the statutory elements of the two 
offenses are related, and that the evidence provides a reasonable 
basis for a finding of not guilty of the greater crime and a 
finding of guilty on the lesser offense. See, State v. Gotschall, 
782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989); State v. Singh, 171 Utah,Adv. Rep. 39, 41 
(Utah App. 1991) . Due Process entitles a defendant to have the jury 
instructed on his theory of the case. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 
13 
159 (Utah 1983) . This court must view the evidence and the 
inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most favorable 
to the defense. State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 532 (Utah 1983). And, 
the Utah Court of Appeals recently held: "We review a trial court's 
refusal to give a requested instruction under a correction of error 
standard, granting no particular deference to the trial court's 
ruling". State v. Sherard, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Utah App. 1991). 
Appellant requested that the court provide an instruction 
giving the jury the alternative of finding the defendant guilty of 
negligent homicide, or child abuse, and/or aggravated assault. The 
evidence did provide ample support for the jury to find the 
defendant not guilty of murder and guilty of negligent homicide, 
notwithstanding Appellee's lengthy but limited view of the facts. 
The child suffered a broken rib and some bruises the day of his 
death. Trial, Tr. 43 6-43 9. There was also substantial evidence that 
the child was eating caramel candy at the time of his death, Tr. 
217, as well as police testimony that Mr. Allen admitted hitting 
the child. See, Tr. 604. The jury could have concluded that the boy 
aspirated the candy when the defendant struck him in the ribs. 
That factual scenario presents a classic case of negligent homicide 
under UCA 7 6-5-2 06. Negligent homicide is related to manslaughter. 
Both require "a gross deviation" from the standard of care 
exercised by the ordinary person. State v. Standiford, 769 P. 2d 
254, 267 (Utah 1988). The key difference is that manslaughter 
requires that the defendant was actually aware of the risk of 
death, while in negligent homicide the defendant was not. 
14 
Standiford, supra, citing Boqcress v. State, 655 P. 2d 654, 656-658 
(Utah 1982) (Stewart, J., concurring); State v. Sherard, 169 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 50, 53 (Utah App. 1991) . These principles are not 
applicable to the other homicide statutes. See, State v. Tillman, 
750 P. 2d 546, 569 (Utah 1987) ("no unintentional, negligent, or 
accidental killing regardless of the circumstances can be first 
degree murder"). Accordingly, a lesser included offense as to 
negligent homicide would have been appropriate. 
However, Appellee claims that Appellant waived any objection 
to the denial of these requested instructions because of the 
failure to set out in detail any opposing argument, contrary to 
Rule 19(c), U.R.Cr.P. Appellant did submit a requested instruction 
on negligent homicide. Appellant also objected to the exclusion of 
this and other proposed instructions without providing the lengthy 
argument which Appellee feels is required under the rule. Should 
the Court feel that Appellant's objection was not adequate, it 
should consider the issues in any event. 
Rule 19(c), U.R.Cr.P., provides for appellate review in the 
event of a failure to preserve a point on appeal in cases "to avoid 
a manifest injustice". And Rule 103(d), Utah Rules of Evidence, 
allows this court to take "notice of plain errors affecting 
substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention 
of the court". State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990). The 
standard under both rules is that the error must be plain, that it 
should have been obvious to the trial court that it was committing 
error, and that the omission affected the substantial rights of a 
15 
party. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989). 
The State's theory of the case clearly focused on their 
contention that Mr. Allen had suffocated the child while in the 
course of assaultive and abusive behavior. Appellee's Brief, at p. 
31. There was also considerable discussion by the four medical 
experts during the trial that the child may have choked on a piece 
of Rollo's candy. See, e.g., Trial, Tr. 564-567. The defense 
encouraged this latter idea throughout the trial, and it should 
have been more than apparent to the trial court that the proposed 
negligent homicide instruction would fit neatly into this theory. 
The absence of the negligent homicide instruction, as well as 
the lack of the other requested instructions, did substantially 
impact Mr. Allen's defense, since the remaining instructions 
offered the jury no option but to convict should they come to the 
conclusion that he committed abusive acts without the intent 
necessary for a murder conviction. This conclusion is reasonable 
under the evidence. See, Trial, Tr. 604 (Mr. Allen tells 
investigator Hines that he hit the child not intending to kill 
him) . Accordingly, this Court should reverse Mr. Allen's conviction 
and remand the case for a new trial. 
POINT FOUR 
THE EVIDENCE, PARTICULARLY AS TO DEFENDANT'S 
INTENT, AND AS TO WHETHER HE IN FACT CAUSED 
THE CHILD'S DEATH, WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE CONVICTION. 
16 
Mr. Allen asserts that the evidence is insufficient, 
particularly as to whether proof of his intent justifies a murder 
conviction. Appellantf s Brief, p. 40-43. In response, the State 
misstates both the facts and Appellant's position. Appellee's 
Brief, p. 55-59. Appellant has not conceded that the victim died 
a non accidental death. Any inference to the contrary may arise 
during Appellant's marshalling of the facts. Those facts are based 
solely on admissible evidence, e.g., State v. Oliver, 170 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 44, 47 (Utah App. 1991), and which are required for adequate 
appellate review. Scharf v. BMG Corp. , 700 P. 2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 
1985). 
State v. James. supra, at 15-18, determined that the evidence 
was sufficient as to the defendant's intent to support a murder 
conviction. The State argues, Appellee's Brief, p. 58-59, that the 
circumstantial evidence relative to intent includes the destruction 
of evidence, urging the mother to not authorize an autopsy, and 
making inconsistent statements to investigators and others as to 
the events of the boy's death. However, the James court held, at 
16, that a defendant's flight cannot be used as evidence of intent, 
and that efforts to conceal the crime or to forestall investigation 
are likewise inadmissible. 
The remaining evidence in James, namely, the defendant's past 
history of conduct toward the victim and the circumstances 
surrounding the child's disappearance, according to two Justices, 
was sufficient on this issue. Nevertheless, three other Justices, 
at 24, felt that this evidence may not be sufficient should the 
17 
jury disbelieve an informant who extracted a jail house confession. 
Although weak on the issue of intent, the facts in James are much 
stronger than those found in this case, since the Allen facts raise 
a much stronger inference that the victim died accidently. 
Accordingly, there is a proper basis for this Court, should Mr. 
Allen's other defenses fail, to remand the case for the entry of a 
manslaughter conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse Mr. Allen's conviction and grant a 
new trial. 
Dated this 7th day of November, 1991. 
Michael H. Wray 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered four copies of the 
foregoing to the office of the Utah Attorney General, to the 
attention of Christine F. Soltis, at 23 6 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, this 7th day of November, 1991. 
Dated this 7th day of November, 1991. 
Eric P. Swenson 
Michael H. Wray 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM NUMBER ONE 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You have heard evidence that the defendant committed acts similar 
to acts alleged to have occurred incident to the crime charged her. You 
may consider such evidence, not to prove that the defendant did the acts 
charged here, but only to prove defendants state of mind, that is, that 
the defendant acted with the necessary intent and not through accident 
or mistake. 
Therefore, if you find: 
1) that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 
f]\e defendant committed the acts charged in the information, and 
2) that the defendant committed similar acts at other times, 
then you may consider these similar acts as evidence that the defendant 
committed the acts charged here deliberately and not through accident or 
mistake* 
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taken care of, that I would be able to confer with my 
attorney during arraignment — which was as far as I know -
Q That doesn't answer my question, sir. Did they 
ask you or — or did they tell you specifically that you 
could not have an attorney before the arraignment? 
A Not specifically, no. 
MR. PARRISH: Okay. I have nothing further, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. SWENSON: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. You may step down, 
Mr. Allen. 
MR. SWENSON: Your Honor, the next portion of 
our evidence is — we offer and ask the court to accept into 
evidence the tape recording of Mr. Allen's arrest. 
THE COURT: That portion that was recorded -
MR. SWENSON: That portion — 
THE COURT: (Continuing) — of which I have 
read the transcript that was attached to your motion? 
MR. SWENSON: Well, there seems to be some 
disagreement as to the accuracy of the transcript. In any 
event, I know Mr. Parrish has an objection to use of this 
evidence, but which I'm sure we'll hear, but — 
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THE COURT: Well, of course, we don't object 
to it in this hearing. I don't know that we can allow it in 
the trial or not; but as far as the — if it has any 
materiality with regard to the Motion to Suppress. So what did 
you want me to do, Mr. Swenson? 
MR. SWENSON: I want you to listen to the 
tape. 
THE COURT: You mean your transcription of it 
is not accurate? 
MR. SWENSON: Well ~ 
MR. PARRISH: No, it isn't, Your Honor. 
We've had the sheriff's office and people that were there go 
back over it, and there are several places, especially the 
ones that were relied upon by the defense that are 
inaccurate in the transcript. And we have a revised 
transcript that was typed by the sheriff's office that they 
claim is accurate. And we've got a witness here that can 
talk about listening to that, and the witness that was 
recording it and can testify as to the accuracy. Because of 
the dispute, I guess I have a problem with the court relying 
simply on the transcript that was provided by the defense 
because it is inaccurate. If the court is inclined to 
listen to that type of evidence, it might be better just to 
listen to the tape and hear for yourself. My objection to 
that is simply materiality. I don't believe that there's 
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been any showing of any causal connection between what 
occurred at the time of the arrest and what occurs thirty 
hours later when Mr. Allen is interviewed by Mr. Hines and 
Mr. Printz. And he's basically admitted on the stand that 
he wasn't in fear of these people, that there was no 
particular problem related to that. And under case law, it 
seems to me, unless you can show that causal connection, the 
defendant can't rely on things that happened that remotely 
from the time of the entry. 
THE COURT: Of course, I think this — Mr. 
Swenson, I have, of course, read the transcript that you 
provided. I've gone through it. And, of course, I am of 
the opinion that even if taken — if this is correct, I can 
take it into account. But I don't think there's sufficient 
error that it has any materiality on whether or not — what 
he was doing at the time he gave the statement. 
MR. SWENSON: Well, we believe, of course, 
the transcript is just one dimensional — 
THE COURT: Well, I know. I know. I realize 
that. 
MR. SWENSON: And the recording of the voices 
certainly — 
THE COURT: What I'm going to do, even though 
Of course, it's your contention, is it, Mr. Parrish, 
that actually the directed transcript isn't as strong as the 
149 
Jane Musselman 
lertrfied Court Transcriber 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
words used here? 
MR. PARRISH: There are a few parts that 
don't support the defendant's version of what happened. But 
again, they're all part of something that — I think the 
whole thing is immaterial. That's my feeling. 
MR. SWENSON: I think it goes to the question 
of the weight. I cited Brown vs. Illinois and some of these other 
cases — 
THE COURT: Of course, I'm just interested in 
getting this information without having to sit and listen to 
that tape. I don't want to listen to that tape, because I 
have practically what was said. And unless there is 
something in there that is stronger than what material 
you've got here, I'll take this and use it in my decision. 
That's the point. 
MR. PARRISH: Well, Your Honor, based on what 
you have indicated, I have no objection at this point to 
that process. In other words, the state is not asking you 
to review that tape. 
THE COURT: So I will take this, Mr. Swenson, 
and we'll consider it as what happened, at least as far as 
that recording is concerned. And I have read it so, in 
effect I know basically what the tape says. 
MR. SWENSON: I guess, Your Honor, the 
problem is that the dry words simply don't address real 
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meaning to the affair that — 
THE COURT: Of course, you don't contend that 
this records everything that occurred? 
MR. SWENSON: Well, as to when the tape 
recording was on — 
THE COURT: Well, sure, when it was on. But 
it wasn't on all the time? 
MR. SWENSON: Well, there was a period before 
hand that — 
THE COURT: Sure. This was only just a 
partial — of the actual recording? 
MR. SWENSON: Well, as to the point we're 
trying to raise and emphasize, it covers virtually 
everything. So it's complete as to — 
THE COURT: Well, anyway, I will take this 
and you can use it in your argument — legal argument to the 
court as being what the tape says. So anything else, Mr. 
Swenson? 
MR. SWENSON: No. We rest. 
THE COURT: All right. Any rebuttal, Mr. 
Parrish? 
MR. PARRISH: If I might have just a moment, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. PARRISH: Your Honor, we would like to 
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that needs to be made outside the — 
THE COURT: All right. Ladies And gentlemen, 
the Court is going to hear a matter that I have to rule on. 
So while you're outside the presence of the Court, don't 
discuss the case among yourselves, don't allow anyone to 
discuss it in your presence, and don't make up your minds on 
any issue until it's finally submitted to you. Just step 
outside the court for a moment, please. 
(Whereupon, the jury leaves the presence of 
the court.) 
THE COURT: We'll have the record show that 
we're now in session outside the hearing of the jury. Mr. 
Swenson, I assume that the next questions to the defendant 
would be relative to the incident involving his arrest; is 
that correct? 
MR. SWENSON: That's correct, Your Honor. 
The entire sequence of events that we covered last week in 
the Motion Hearing dealing with what, we believe, were 
allegations of abuse of Mr. Allen by the police. 
THE COURT: I take it Mr. Allen would testify 
very much how he did at the Hearing relative to these 
incidents? 
MR. SWENSON: He would, Your Honor, although 
in more detail. I think there was some limitation last week 
as to the broad range; but essentially, it would be the 
789 
e MiiMelman 
«* Court Transcriber 
0. Box 531 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
""Jane Musselman 
same, yes. And in that regard, there is a matter which also 
was covered in the Evidentiary Ruling last week concerning the 
tape recording of the events of this abusive arrest, which 
we would also, as part of the proffer of Mr. Allen's 
testimony, would like to now ask the Court admit into 
evidence. The foundation was laid, of course, at the 
Motions Hearing. We'd like that admitted into evidence and 
to have the jury hear the tape. 
THE COURT: Well, first of all, of course, 
let the record show that I did hear this testimony at a 
Suppression Hearing or Motion in Limine Hearing, and I've 
also read the transcribed of the tape as submitted by the 
defendant. And I ruled at that hearing that those instances 
were immaterial to this case, since they wouldn't help the 
jury; and it opened so many issues where we might get off on 
a side track, whether they were correct or not correct, 
which we don't think would help in any way of disposing of 
the ultimate issues in this case. In other words, the 
prejudicial affect on the proceedings of the trial would 
greatly out weigh any relevance that the transcript — 
possibly could come from the introduction of this evidence. 
This took place, I believe it was, — Well, at least some 
twenty-four hours before Mr. Hines talked to him. Or was 
it? 
MR. SWENSON: Roughly. 
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THE COURT: Twenty-four, twenty-eight hours 
prior; that there wasn't anything in that incident that I 
could find that would have a substantial or even any type of 
effect on his later conduct in his relationship of giving of 
the statement to Mr. Hines. And all it does is open areas 
for dispute which are not material to the case. 
MR. SWENSON: I see. Well, we did want to 
submit it to show his state of mind as he was making the 
statements. 
THE COURT: Well, of course, my ruling is 
that's so far removed. I can't see any evidence where it 
would have any affect upon the state of mind that would 
destroy, at least, his ability — whether or not it was a 
momentary, or whether he was coerced into giving any type 
of a statement later on. 
MR. SWENSON: I see. And I believe we've 
already Briefed all of these issues prior — 
THE COURT: Sure. And I considered those at 
the prior hearing. 
MR. SWENSON: I understand. 
THE COURT: You can reserve your objection -
MR. SWENSON: One other matter, as Attorney 
Wray continues his questioning, I assume — I want to make 
sure this is clear so we don't say something improper in 
791 
•fane Muraelman 
<
-*
r
*«d Court Tiarocribcr 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
front of the jury. He would then ask him if he was arrested 
and then continue on subsequent to the actual events of the 
arrest? Is that the Court's ruling? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. WRAY: Your Honor, I heard, but I'm not 
certain I understand. Am I precluded from asking questions 
relative to the treatment that Mr. Allen received at the 
time of his arrest? 
THE COURT: Yes. You are for the reasons 
stated. 
MR. WRAY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. SWENSON: But Attorney Wrav could examine 
— There was an instance on the way in to the jail in which 
there were some statements made by Mr. Allen to one of the 
officers. And that was not — 
THE COURT: Of course, those statements are 
not in evidence. 
MR. SWENSON: Wasn't there some evidence of 
that at the Hearing? I thought there might have been, and 
I'm preparing a rebuttal witness on that, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: But that's not before this jury. 
MR. SWENSON: Well, not at this point, no. 
THE COURT: There's no evidence of that type 
in the plaintiff's case. 
MR. SWENSON: Well, if it's not raised, we 
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don't intend to offer it. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't know what the 
state's plans are. I only know what's before me now. 
MR. PARRISH: Your Honor, the state's 
position would be that the next point that becomes relevant 
is the time that the interview begins. Under Crane vs. Kentucky, 
the case I cited this morning, the incidents related to the 
arrest — the incidents related to what occurs in the car 
ride to the jail, what occurs in the jail, all of that is 
basically irrelevant from what we've heard in the 
Suppression Hearing. Unless there was some new evidence 
that wasn't presented there. 
THE COURT: Well, that's my ruling, too. 
MR. SWENSON: Could I have the citation of 
that case, Your Honor? I'm sorry to delay the proceeding on 
that, but — 
THE COURT: I think it's in your Memorandum', 
isn't it? 
MR. SWENSON: I don't think it is. 
MR. PARISH: I don't think it is. It's 475 
United States Reports 683. It's United States Supreme Court 
Case of 1986. 
MR. SWENSON: Well, we're a little uncertain 
as to whether the Court's ruling does cover any prior 
statements — 
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THE COURT: Well, the only thing — You'll 
have to proceed and will Mr. Parrish will object, and I'll 
rule. 
MR. SWENSON: I'm just trying to get this 
straighten out so we understand. 
THE COURT: Sure. But I'm telling you now if 
you go into any of those incidents relative to what happened 
to the time of his arrest, under the present state of the 
evidence and my ruling, you can't bring that in; and you 
cannot use the tape at this particular point. My ruling 
about the tape — it's only a partial tape. It doesn't tape 
the entire sequence. It was taped by one of the officers 
and only included a portion of the sequence relative to his 
arrest. So it could be distorted and taken clear out of 
context. But I don't want to get into the context, because 
the whole episode — it's immaterial to the issue that 
happened here in Moab. And to get into that, then we put on 
rebuttal witnesses about it; then we're fighting whether he 
had a good arrest or whether he was arrested in Idaho or 
Montana, which is immaterial. That's another reason. 
MR. SWENSON: I understand. Thank you very 
much 
THE COURT: All right. You may call back in 
the jury. 
(Whereupon, the jury returns to the 
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courtroom.) 
THE COURT: We'll have the record show the 
jury has now returned to the courtroom. And you may 
proceed, Mr. Wray. 
MR. WRAY: Thank you, Your Honor. I 
apologize for the brief delay, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION, continuing 
BY MR. WRAY; 
Q Steve, you were arrested? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And you were taken to jail? 
A Yes. 
Q And do you remember what day of the week this 
would have been? 
A At the time, I didn't know what day of the week it 
was. 
Q Okay. Do you remember meeting Mr. Hines? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q What's the first time you saw Mr. Hines? 
A The sheriff escorted me into the conference room. 
It was an interrogation room. 
Q Let me ask: When you say the sheriff, who do you 
mean? 
A Sheriff Printz of Ravili County, Montana. 
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Date 
Time 
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand 
your rights. 
You have the right to remain silent. 
Anything you say can be used against you in court. 
You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice 
before we ask you any questions and to have him with you during 
questioning. 
If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed 
for you before any questioning, if you wish. 
If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer 
present, you will still have the right to stop answering at any 
time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time 
until you talk to a lawyer. 
WAIVER OF RIGHTS 
I have read this statement of my rights, and I 
understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement 
and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I 
understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have 
been made to me, and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been 
used against me. 
Witness 
Witness 
Signed.. 
Time Date 
